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Multi-level Disputes relating to Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike: 







This article examines disputes regarding the connection between freedom of association and 
the right to strike, occurring at multiple levels, within international, regional and national 
legal orders. It focuses on the period from 2007 – 2019, when a challenge was made to norms 
long-established at the International Labour Organisations (ILO) that was subsequently 
continued in European and national court proceedings. These events raised the potential for 
normative fragmentation and conflict between legal systems. This article interrogates the 
roles played by two key actors in these processes: the International Organization of 
Employers (IOE) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Drawing on 
sociological insights into collective action offered by Offe and Wiesenthal, transposed to the 
transnational level, an analysis is offered of the power dynamics that motivated IOE attempts 
to alter the content and influence of ILO norms, alongside the scope for ITUC resistance, 
given its resources.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Freedom of association’ has been recognised as a national constitutional principle,2 but also 
in international and regional human rights instruments relating to civil and political rights, 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).  The concrete protections associated 
with collective labour law, such as the right to strike, are set out in instruments addressing 
socio-economic entitlements, notably the European Social Charter 1961 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR).  In this complex 
national, regional and international matrix, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has 
navigated a bridge between these categories of rights, for example linking freedom of 
association to the right to strike in the jurisprudence of its supervisory bodies, especially the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
and the tripartite Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). The CFA 
has repeatedly found that ‘the right to strike is one of the essential means through which 
workers and their organizations may promote and defend their economic and social 
interests’.3  Both the CFA and the CEACR regard the right to strike also as ‘an intrinsic 
corollary to the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87’, 4 and have continued to 
pursue normative consistency.5  
This article considers recent events during which that connection made by the ILO 
between freedom of association, the right to organise and the right to strike has been 
challenged, initially by an employers’ group ‘walk out’ at the ILO6 and subsequently. This 
 
2 See Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, and strikes, 68(1) Current Legal Problems 267 (2015); and 
Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The enduring idea of labour law (OUP 2014). 
3 ILO CFA Compilation of Decisions on Freedom of Association paras 753 (ILO 2018).  
4 Ibid., para. 754; also CEACR, General Survey on Freedom of Association 66 (ILO 1994); 
and Report of the CEACR on Application of International Labour Standards 73 (ILO 2014).  
5 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horatio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right 
to Strike 59 (ILO 1998). 
6 Janice Bellace, The ILO and the Right to Strike, 153 Int’l Lab. Rev. 29 (2014); Claire La 
Hovary, Showdown at the ILO? A Historical Perspective on the Employers’ Group’s 2012 




challenge has been manifested at various times and places, threatening fragmentation of 
norms.7 It is a complex journey to map.  
In doing this mapping, this article draws on the idea of ‘transnational’ labour law, 
which considers how the creation and application of labour standards cross national borders. 
This entails attention to communications between public international law institutions, such 
as the ILO, European Union (EU) and Council of Europe, but also to the actors which 
navigate these systems.8 In particular, I investigate the roles played by the International 
Organization of Employers (IOE) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).  
My suggestion is that a sociological perspective on collective action, transposed to a 
global level, sheds light on the role played by the IOE in challenging what previously seemed 
to be a stable linkage between the freedom of  association and the right to strike, both at the 
ILO and beyond. The tension between two logics of collective action may also assist in 
understanding how the ITUC and its allies understood their options and resources when 
seeking to respond to this challenge in various settings.  
 
II. THE INTER-SYSTEMIC ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
OF EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS 
 
Each international, regional and national legal institution has its own internal normative logic 
stemming from a distinctive constitutional base and functional objectives.9 They may be 
regarded also as separate systems which are operationally (or normatively) closed, but 
simultaneously cognitively open to learning.10 When systems interact, the disruption or 
 
7 As discussed briefly by Kerry Rittich, The ILO: Challenges in times of crisis, 154(1) Int’l 
Lab. Rev. 85 (2015). For broader concerns, see Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi 
(2006), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf. 
8 See Adelle Blackett, Theorizing Emancipatory Transnational Futures of International 
Labor Law 113 AJIL Unbound 390 (2019); Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock, 
Conceptualizing Transnational Labour Law ch. 1 (Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock eds, 
2015). 
9 Kalina Arabadjieva, A Framework for Interpreting the Right to Freedom of Association of 
Workers and Trade Unions in European Human Rights Law (Oxford DPhil thesis 2019). 
10  Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford, 1995 – reprint, originally published 1984); and 
Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1993). Discussed in Tonia 
Novitz, Evolutionary Trajectories for Transnational Labour Law: Trade in Goods to Trade 




‘perturbations’ can prompt change,11 but these are filtered through their own internal 
normative framework, so the outcomes cannot be simply pre-determined.12 Proponents of 
reflexive labour law would argue accordingly that institutions like the ILO cannot simply 
‘command and control’ other institutions, as this is not how systems inter-relate. What 
matters are the procedures through which systems communicate.13  
Notably, Simon Deakin has also observed that such communication has impact through 
the interaction of ‘agents’.14 This observation chimes with concern expressed by Harry 
Arthurs that a focus only on procedures could facilitate and obscure shifts in power, in 
particular between collective representatives of management and labour.15 This part begins by 
introducing the IOE and ITUC as two significant transnational actors that play a key role in 
disputes relating to freedom of association. They both have the capacity to contest and defend 
systemic norms, and also may seek to transport norms from one system (or even disputes 
raised there) into another. This part then goes on to consider how their global inter-systemic 
campaigns might be understood in sociological terms, with reference to the ‘two logics of 
collective action’ identified by Claude Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal.16 
 
A. The IOE and ITUC 
 
The IOE and the ITUC are embedded in the ILO’s tripartite structure, even though they have, 
to different degrees, further influence in a range of international, regional and national fora.17  
The IOE acts as the secretariat for the employers’ group at the ILO, but is institutionally 
 
11 Simon Deakin, Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches, 7(3) 
Review of Law and Economics 659, 677 (2011); see also Simon Deakin, Evolution for our 
Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 Current Legal Problems 1 (2003). 
12 Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The differentiation of the 
legal system, 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419 (1992); and Teubner n.10, 35. 
13 Discussed in Ralf Rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Edward Elgar 
2013), chs 1-3. 
14 Simon Deakin, Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches, 7(3) 
Review of Law and Economics 659, 677 (2011), 677. 
15 Harry Arthurs, Corporate Self-Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and 
Reflexive Labour Law ch. 2 (Brian Bercusson, Cynthia Estlund, eds, 2008). 
16 Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical notes on 
social class and organizational form, 1(1) Political Power and Social Theory 67 (1980). 
17 Claire La Hovary, A Challenging Ménage à Trois? Tripartism in the International Labour 




separate from the Bureau for Employers’ Activities  established within the ILO (ACTEMP).18 
The ITUC provides parallel support for the ILO workers’ group, distinct from the Bureau for 
Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV).19  
The particular history of each organisation seems significant in demarcating its 
operational concerns. The IOE was founded in 1920 and given its present name in 1938. 
Known for specialising in ‘social matters’ at the ILO, the IOE has long been one of ‘two 
organisations representing the undertakings of the market economy countries’. 20 The other is 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which is known to specialise in ‘economic 
matters’.21 In 1971, they reached agreement on their respective roles, but a study by Marieke 
Louis in 2016 found that they were in fact in ‘competition’, such that the IOE was ‘side-
lined’ in various international economic settings.22 Her interviews with IOE representatives 
exposed their criticism of both the ICC and the World Economic Forum (WEF),23 indicating 
that representatives of business interests may not constitute ‘a collaborative and homogenous 
group’. 24  
There are indications that the IOE is seeking to expand its representative role. The 
IOE has broadened its membership base, with a change of rules in 2019, to include also 
corporate organisations, previously represented only in the ICC.25 In 2020, the Vice-President 
of the IOE advocated an increased institutional role for ‘the global social partner 
organisations’ in other parts of the UN (beyond the ILO) and regional organisations.26 
Moreover, in its current promotional literature, the IOE is described as ‘the sole 
 
18 ‘ILO Bureau for Employers’ Activities (ACTEMP)’ (April 29, 2020), 
https://www.ilo.org/actemp/lang--en/index.htm.  
19 ‘ILO Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV)’ (April 29, 2020), 
https://www.ilo.org/actrav/lang--en/index.htm.  
20 Jean-Jacques Oechslin, Employers' Organisations: Current Trends and Social 
Responsibilities, 121 Int'l Lab. Rev. 503, 515-516 (1982).  
21 Ibid.  
22 Marieke Louis, The ILO, Social Partners and the G20: New prospects for social dialogue 
at the global level?, 16(3) Global Social Policy 235, 240 - 244 (2016). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 244. 
25 Ibid., 241. See IOE Statutes (2019), Article 2, http://www.ioe-
emp.org/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=145587&token=c4497389ebbad1597b105c949f6
9f11cb2a01a35&L=0.   
26 Renate Hornung-Draus, Cross-border Social Dialogue from the Perspective of Employers, 




representative of business’ at the ILO, but also as being recognised ‘across the UN, G20 and 
other emerging forums… for its unique expertise, advocacy and influence’.27  
The ITUC was created only in 2006, with the merger of two previously divided trade 
union confederations,28 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and 
the World Confederation of Labour (WCL).29 At the time, the inaugural ITUC Secretary 
General, Guy Ryder, announced that: ‘Together, united, strong, the ITUC will play its part in 
building social justice, freedom, equality and peace …’30 This message of unification has 
been significant for ITUC relationships with regional and global trade union confederations.   
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) was created in 1973, leading to a 
decision by the ICFTU (one of the co-founders of the ITUC) to dis-establish its own 
European branch and instead work constructively with this new entity. 31 The ETUC 
subsequently gained significant access to European-level social dialogue with European 
management alongside EU institutional funding. Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick sees the 
ETUC as a forerunner of the unity accomplished in formation of the ITUC, insofar as the 
ETUC had admitted both ICFTU and WCL affiliates as its members.32 Since 2006, the ETUC 
has worked collaboratively with the ITUC. Their headquarters are in the same building and 
they organise various activities and campaigns together. 
The ‘International Trade Secretariats’ established before the first World War changed 
their titles in 2002 to ‘Global Union Federations’ (GUFs) to reflect their engagement in 
 




28 See Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, The International Labour Movement: Structure and 
Dynamics (Peter Fairbrother, Christian Lévesque, Marc-Antonin Hennebert, eds., 2013); 
Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, The International Trade Union Confederation: From Two 
(or More?) Identities to One, 51(2) BJIR 240 (2013b). 
29 There was a decline in the funding and influence of more militant World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU) after the demise of the Soviet Union but the WFTU continues to 
represent the communist-led trade union movement, having influence still in developing 
states. See ‘History’ (April 29, 2020), http://www.wftucentral.org/history/. Also, Gumbrell-
McCormick (2013b) n.28 above, 247 and 253; and Louis n.22 above, 240.  
30 As reported in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Jürgen Eckl, International Trade Union Movement: 
Mergers and Contradictions Friedrich Ebert Stiftung briefing papers No. 1/2007, Part 1 
(2007). 
31 Ibid., Part 4. 
32 Elizabeth Cotton and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, Global Unions as Imperfect 
Multilateral Organizations: An international relations perspective, 33(4) Economic and 




global sectoral union organising and bargaining.33 They have allied themselves to the ITUC.34 
In addition, the ITUC works in tandem with the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) 
in the OECD, again sharing many affiliates.35 The ITUC has also sought a highly inclusive 
representative role in relation to precarious and what have been described as ‘non­standard’ 
workers.36 
Despite tensions between economic and social legal frameworks,37 the ITUC seems to 
have had access to representation in many global forums, with the cooperation of its wider 
allies.38 That success in unification of various facets of the trade union movement may also 
help to explain the unprecedented election of a highly successful global trade union official, 
Guy Ryder, to the position of ILO Director General in 2012, being a previous Secretary 
General of both the ICFTU (from 2002-2006) and the ITUC (from 2006-2010).39 
 
B. A sociological analysis of collective action applied transnationally  
 
Louis mentioned very briefly, in her critique of IOE activities and influences, the potential 
relevance of a sociological analysis offered by two German commentators, Claus Offe and 
Helmut Wiesenthal. 40 Their analysis was aimed at the operation of large and confederal 
employers’ and workers’ associations in a domestic setting,41 but may offer a useful frame for 
examination of the power relations which shape the activities of even larger transnational 
representatives of management and labour.   
 
33 Traud-Merz and Eckl n.30 above, Part 2.  
34 See Michele Ford and Michael Gillan, The Global Union Federations in International 
Industrial Relations: A critical review, 57(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 456 (2015). 
35 ‘About TUAC’ (April 29, 2020), https://members.tuac.org/en/public/tuac/index.phtml; and 
‘About ITUC’ (April 29, 2020), https://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us.   
36 La Hovary (2015) n.17, 223. See more recently, ‘ITUC Policy Brief Organising and 
Collective Bargaining in Non-Standard Forms of Work’ (April 29, 2020), https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/organising_and_collective_bargaining_and_non-
standard_forms_of_work_en.pdf.   
37 See Eric Tucker, Labour's Many Constitutions (and Capital's Too), 33 Comparative Labor 
Law and Policy Journal 355 (2012). 
38 Louis n.22 above, 240. 
39 ‘Biography of Guy Ryder, 10th ILO Director-General’ (April 29, 2020),  
https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/ilo-director-
general/WCMS_205241/lang--en/index.htm.  
40 Louis n.22, 236. 
41 Examined for e.g. in Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, Error! Main Document Only.There 
is Power in a Union? Revisiting Trade Union Functions in 2019 ch. 14, 263 - 264 (Alan 




 Offe and Wiesenthal considered how substantive inequality was institutionalized by  
‘the liberal equation’, namely insistence on the equivalence of interests of capital and labour 
as if they were symmetrical and capable of being represented in the same ways.42 On this 
reading, the IOE and ITUC may both be interest groups treated with formal parity within the 
ILO, but may possess different sources of institutional power.  
 Offe and Wiesenthal observed that a trade union faces a considerable challenge in 
seeking to organise a heterogeneous workforce.43 They identified a trade-off for trade unions 
between size and power, recognised previously by Olson in relation to the free-rider 
problem.44 For Offe and Wiesenthal the difficulty is that, while trade unions may seek to 
increase their membership size in order to counteract an employer’s superior bargaining 
power, as they do so, they become less equipped to represent their diverse membership. 
Moreover, unions’ success ‘depends upon their sanctioning potential’, namely the 
‘willingness to act’ on the part of members. If a union becomes too large and thereby 
bureaucratized, it no longer has that source of influence.45  
This is an inevitable problem for any large confederation of trade unions, whether 
national, regional (like the ETUC) or globally operating on a sectoral level (like the GUFs). It 
poses enormous difficulties for the very largest international trade union confederation, the 
ITUC, that allies these entities and hundreds of affiliates.46 Being large seems however an 
increasing imperative in a globally integrated trading system.47 Arguably, the best that the 
ITUC can hope for is to keep that capacity or willingness to act alive in the affiliates of its 
constituent national-level members. Arguably, this is precisely what the IOE challenge to the 
right to strike has sought to threaten. 
By way of contrast, according to Offe and Wiesenthal, employers being ‘the 
powerful’ will be ‘fewer in number, … less likely to be divided among themselves, have a 
clearer view of what they want to defend, and have larger resources for organized action’.48 
This is a view which has subsequently been applied to transnational employer interests, 
 
42 Offe and Wiesenthal n.16 above, 68 - 71. 
43 Ibid., 75. 
44 Mancur Olson Jr. The Logic of Collective Action––Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Schocken 1968). 
45 Offe and Wiesenthal n.16 above, 80 – 81. 
46 In November 2019, the ITUC had over 200 million worker members in 332 affiliated 
organisations in 163 countries and territories. See ‘List of ITUC Affiliates’ (April 29, 2020), 
https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/list_of_affiliates_nov_2019.pdf.  
47 Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (2013b), n.28, 256. 




which are not ‘unitary’, but can achieve ‘a unity of purpose and direction’.49 Offe and 
Wiesenthal also assume that the interests as employers (as manifestations of business) lie in 
the status quo, which protects their privilege.50 As we shall see, these claims do not easily 
map onto the circumstances of the IOE, which illustrates the capacity for representation of 
business to be divided on the world stage,51 and also that employers may have an interest in 
changing the status quo (or at least that in the ILO).  
 Offe and Wiesenthal, in observing the standard imbalance of power between 
employer and worker associations, further identified five stages through which unions move 
towards reliance on ‘established and recognized channels of political action’.52 While these 
two commentators were concerned with the risks of such engagement at the national level, 
we might extrapolate from their analysis dangers also for the ITUC.   
Stage one arises when a small sized union is formed around a particular ‘collective 
identity’ and ‘willingness to act’.53 Stage two takes place when the organisation is capable of 
gaining concessions through ‘its recognized potential of power’, not just because of a strike, 
but ‘in order to avoid a strike’.54 Stage three occurs as the organisation grows in size but also 
becomes more bureaucratic, limiting its ability to mobilise members to take collective action. 
The union then becomes more dependent on ‘external guarantees’ offered by the state (and 
employers) that it will be treated with respect:   
It will try to become, with the help of its external supporters, incorporated into the 
formal decision-making process on economic and other policies. It will try to have as 
many as possible of its bargaining positions, which it had held formerly only because 
of the ‘willingness to act’ of the members, institutionalized and sanctioned by legal 
statutes.55 
This is also an observation that chimes with a power resource approach, as posited by Walter 
Korpi and others, such that where corporatist governance prevails, the incidence of strikes 
 
49 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The 
Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists’ 5(2) New Political Economy 157, 159 
(2000). 
50 Ibid., 91. 
51 Louis, n.22, 240. 
52 Offe and Wiesenthal n.16 above, 104. 
53 Ibid., 106. 
54 Ibid. 




will decline, because there has been a shift from structural power in the labour market to 
reliance on political resources.56   
Offe and Wiesenthal noted that the trade-off for a trade union in exchange for 
inclusion in the political processes would be acceptance of those processes. They described 
this as ‘a perfectly rational strategy of transformation, which…’ may work well when ‘social 
democratic parties are strong political forces’ that can secure such guarantees.57 One can also 
arguably see parallels here with the ‘embedded liberalism’ resisting commodification of 
labour, which the ILO was designed to craft,58 and the attraction of tripartite governance for 
workers’ organisations globally. 
 The problem comes in stage four when the trade union ‘no longer has any capacity to 
resist attempts to withdraw external support and the externally provided legal and 
institutional status’.59 Then the external guarantees will become open to threat. Where the 
structurally powerful position of employers remains intact, there will be a reversal of these 
political protections ‘as soon as political and/or economic conditions are favorable enough to 
attempt an attack’.60 Arguably, the employers’ group walk out at the ILO might be 
characterised in this way as an exercise of power which, contextually, the ITUC can do little 
to resist.  
The fifth stage identified by Offe and Wiesenthal is a ‘return to a type of collective 
action in which the members’ “willingness to act” is of predominant importance’. But stage 
five will be different from stage one, insofar as it will tend to ‘focus on a much broader range 
of political, legal, and institutional arrangements, which have played such an important and 
 
56 See Walter Korpi, Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and 
Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power 3(2) Sociological Theory, 31 (1985); Kerstin 
Enflo, Tobias Karlsson, and Jakob Molinder. The Power Resource Theory Revisited: What 
Explains the Decline in Industrial Conflicts in Sweden?. No. 13130. CEPR Discussion Papers 
(2018); and Stefan Schmalz, Carmen Ludwig, Edward Webster, The Power Resources 
Approach: Developments and challenges 9 Global Labour Journal, 113, 116 - 117 (2018). 
57 Offe and Wiesenthal, n.16 above, 107.  
58 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (1944, 2nd ed. Beacon Press 2001), 27- 28 and 75-79; Gareth Dale, In Search of Karl 
Polanyi’s International Relations Theory, 42 Review of International Studies 401, 419 – 422 
(2016); also John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded 
liberalism in the post-war economic order 36(2) International Organization 385 (1982). 
Discussed in Tonia Novitz, Past and Future Work at the International Labour Organization: 
Labour as a Fictitious Commodity, Countermovement and Sustainability 17 International 
Organizations Law Review 10 (2020).  





deceptive role in the prior stages’.61 Offe and Wiesenthal therefore saw political engagement 
to secure ‘external guarantees’ as ‘precarious’, ‘unstable’ and potentially ‘transitory’, 
threatening the survival of the union.62 This account invites us to consider how the ITUC is 
facing (and meeting) a fifth stage challenge. Offe and Wiesenthal consider that this can only 
be successfully done by a return to engagement with collective action, which is difficult to 
achieve, but to which the ITUC has sought to have some recourse. There might also be scope 
to utilise other sources of influence, such as mobilization through representations in other 
supervisory systems. 63 Indeed, a contemporary power resources approach suggests that the 
ITUC can deploy institutional resources involving communications and coordination among 
its allies in litigation, and seek ‘societal power’ drawing on the messages coming from human 
rights and constitutional systems.64 There also may be other potential strategies available. 
 
III. THE INTERPLAY OF EVENTS AND ACTORS BETWEEN 2007 – 2019 
 
This part of the article traces a series of events, all of which concern the relationship between 
freedom of association and the right to strike, which took place between 2007 and 2019. In 
this twelve-year period, notable developments emerged relating to this controversy within the 
EU, the Council of Europe and the ILO. These, in turn have also had potential implications in 
national level litigation. They are navigated here by following the interplay between these 
systems, for it emerges that they are not insulated from each other. Key players in one site 
would seem to leverage disputes and transpose them to others. Indeed, the transnational 
institutional nature of both the IOE and ITUC enables them to seek to coordinate their 
engagement with jurisprudential developments across systems in a strategic manner. Their 
relative successes and the reasons for these are interrogated here with reference to the 
conceptual model offered by Offe and Wiesenthal.  
 




62 Ibid., 109. 
63 See for discussion of the literature on mobilization, Claire Kilpatrick, Taking the Measure 
of Changing Labour Mobilization at the International Labour Organisation in the wake of 
the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis, 68(3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 665, 691-
692 and 695 (2019). 




Two EU judgments, Viking65and Laval,66 became notorious on the subject of freedom of 
association and the right to strike insofar as the Court of Justice deferred to ILO norms, but 
departed from their commonly understood implications. Previously, the limited legislative 
competence of the EU meant that little had been said in concrete social policy terms on 
freedom of association or the right to strike as entitlements of EU citizens.67 Instead, there 
had been declaratory recognition in Points 11 – 13 of the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSRW), while the right to strike received 
recognition in Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) (although this 
was notionally separate to the guarantee of freedom of association in Article 12).  
Both the Viking and Laval judgments made reference to the ‘various instruments 
which the Member States have signed or cooperated in, such as the European Social 
Charter… and Convention No 87 … ’ going on to refer also to the CCFSRW and the 
EUCFR.68 There was then, in systemic terms, arguably deference by the Court of Justice to 
ILO jurisprudence stating that Convention No. 87 provides a basis for a right to strike. Yet, 
there was also a clash of systems insofar as the Court prioritized the employer’s entitlements 
to free movement - of establishment (in Viking) and of services (in Laval).69 In both cases it 
was found that trade unions could be held financially liable for taking such action, due to 
their role in regulating industrial relations.70 These judgments have been aptly described as 
adopting the perspective of an EU internal market lawyer over that of an ‘international labour 
lawyer’.71  
Transnational collective representation of employers and workers became visible in 
this litigation and its aftermath. In the Viking case, the role of a GUF, the ITF, attracted 
attention. Notably, the ITF describes itself as allied to ITUC (since its creation in 2006, as 
 
65 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union (FSU) v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779 (‘Viking’). 
66 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-
11767 (‘Laval’).  
67 See Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a 
longstanding exclusion dating back to Article 2(6) of the ‘Agreement on Social Policy’ 
appended to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 
68 Viking at para. 43; Laval at para. 90. 
69 Albeit in different ways, see Viking, para. 75; Laval, para. 107 (and para. 103). 
70 Viking, para. 65; Laval, para 98. Discussed in Anne Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ, 37(2) Industrial Law Journal 126 (2008). 
71 Alan Bogg, Viking and Laval: The International Labour Law Perspective (Mark Freedland 




discussed previously).72 It was the ETUC (which as noted above also has its own close 
strategic relationship with the ITUC), that following the outcome in both Viking and Laval, 
actively campaigned for constitutional change in the EU.73 The ETUC was consistently 
opposed by what was the Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne (UNICE), 
since 2007 renamed ‘BusinessEurope’.74 BusinessEurope currently consists of 40 
representatives currently from 35 countries, with a membership overlaps with that of the 
IOE.75 The intensity of engagement by the IOE and the ITUC on this issue was yet to come.  
 
B. The Council of Europe case law 2008 – 2009 
 
While the Court of Justice recognised but restricted exercise of the right to strike in the EU, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Council of Europe took a different tack. 
The Council of Europe’s two leading human rights instruments had seemed starkly divided, 
to the extent that Article 11 of the ECHR guaranteed freedom of association, including the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests, while the European 
Social Charter (ESC) set out in Articles 5 and 6 obligations to protect collective bargaining 
and a right to strike.76 The ECtHR had previously used this division to defend its reticence to 
link collective bargaining or the right to strike to freedom of association.77  
The Viking judgment was, at least in part, premised on the view of the ECtHR that 
‘collective action’ was merely one of the ways that a trade union could protect its interests 
under Article 11 of the ECHR, but was not essential.78 Two judgments delivered by the 
 
72 ‘About Us’ (April 29, 2020), https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/about-us.. 
73 See https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/etuc-presents-its-position-laval-and-viking-cases-
hearing-european-parliament.  
74 For an account of the history of BusinessEurope, see 
https://www.businesseurope.eu/history-organisation. See also ‘Report on joint work of the 
European social partners on the ECJ rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg 
cases - following the invitation from the Employment and Social Affairs Council and the 
European Commission in November 2008’ (April 29, 2020) available at: 
https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/report-joint-work-european-social-partners-ecj-
rulings-viking-laval-ruffert-and.  
75 Although their lists do not map neatly onto each other. Cf. 
https://www.businesseurope.eu/members with https://www.ioe-emp.org/en/members-
regions/.  
76 Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (OUP 2003), 
chs 6 and 9. 
77 See for a classic statement of this proposition, National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium 
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ECtHR placed that proposition in doubt. First, a right to collective bargaining was considered 
by a Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Demir & Baykara v Turkey to have ‘become one of the 
essential elements’ of the Article 11 guarantee of freedom of association.79 That Turkey had 
not ratified and was not bound by Articles 5 and 6 of the ESC was deemed irrelevant; its 
ratifications of ILO Conventions Nos 98 and 151 were given more attention. Second, in 
Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey,80 in a manner explicitly consistent with ILO CFA and CEACR 
recommendations, the ECtHR made the link between freedom of association and industrial 
action under Article 11. The Court found that exercise of the right to strike should not be 
restricted other than in narrowly defined circumstances which must be provided for by law, 
have a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. In subsequent cases, the 
ECtHR intervened to protect the interests of strikers, on the basis that their punitive treatment 
constituted a violation of freedom of association.81   
This series of judgments from 2008 – 2009 is significant, in that the ILO appears to 
have effectively communicated norms to the Council of Europe ECHR system, which were 
applied systematically, leading to a correction which reduced fragmentation. This emergent 
process has been identified by Virginia Mantouvalou as an ‘integrated’ approach to human 
rights protection.82 This ECtHR jurisprudence also arguably placed pressure on the EU 
market system, fuelling ETUC claims for constitutional and regulatory reform.83 This move 
towards consistency was certainly heralded with considerable approval from the workers’ 
side and their advocates, such as Keith Ewing and John Hendy (leading exponents of 
workers’ human rights within the UK Institute of Employment Rights).84  
 
 
79 Appn 34503/97 Demir and Baykara v Turkey Appn 34503/9, 12 November 2008,, para. 
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26876/02 et 27628/0, Affaire Dilek et Autres v Turquie, Judgment of 17 July 2007.   
81 Appn 67336/01 Danilenkov v Russia, 30 July 2009, para. 123 and Appn 22943/04 Saime 
Özcan v Turkey, 15 September 2009; and Appn 30946/04 Kaya and Seyhan v Turkey, 15 
September 2009. Although not in all cases, such as Appn 4241/03 Trofimchuk v Ukraine 
Appn 4241/03, 28 January 2011. 
82 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An 
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83 Filip Dorssemont, The Right to Take Collective Action: The Prospects of the Accession to 
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C. Reaction in the ILO to the EU and to the Council of Europe 
 
The ILO CEACR responded critically to Court of Justice treatment of the right to strike in the 
EU. That reaction seems to have been one of a number of factors which, together with the 
influence which ILO treatment of collective bargaining and the right to strike now seemed to 
wield in the Council of Europe, led to the dramatic walkout staged by the employers’ group 
in 2012. It was at this stage that the significance of the role played by the IOE became visible.  
 
1. Responding to EU developments 
 
ILO supervisory jurisprudence developed by the CFA and CEACR has stated that the right to 
strike is not unlimited, but that only certain kinds of limitation are permissible.85 The right to 
strike may be restricted in respect of: ‘public servants exercising authority in the name of the 
state’; in essential services ‘the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety 
or health of the whole or part of the population’; and in the event of ‘an acute national 
emergency and for a limited period of time’.86 Free movement of establishment and services 
by employers within a European market system was not regarded as sufficient reason to 
prevent access to industrial action. ‘By linking restrictions on strike action to interference 
with trade and commerce, a broad range of legitimate strike action could be impeded.’87 
Accordingly, in the British Airlines Pilots Association (BALPA) case,88 the CEACR 
expressed ‘serious concern’ regarding ‘the omnipresent threat of an action for damages that 
could bankrupt the union, possible now in the light of the Viking and Laval judgements’.89 
Also, the CEACR 2012 General Survey ‘Giving Globalisation a Human Face’ again asserted 
the relationship between ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98 and the right to strike.90  
 
85 Jeffrey Vogt et al, The Right to Strike in International Law (Hart 2020), 44.  
86 ILO Digest of Decisions of the CFA, 5th ed. (2006), para. 541; now ILO Compilation of 
Decisions of the CFA 6th ed (2018), para. 779 and 824. 
87 ILO Digest of Decisions of the CFA, 5th ed. (2006), para. 592. 
88 See Katherine Apps, Damages Claims Against Trade Unions After Viking and Laval, 34 
European Law Review 141 (2009). 
89  Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(Geneva, International Labour Office, 2010) 208–9. 
90 Discussed by Keith D. Ewing, Myth and Reality of the Right to Strike as a ‘Fundamental 
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These findings can be regarded as a simple defence by the CEACR of the normative 
coherence of the ILO’s supervisory system against a significant threat from an external 
market-based system. As such, they did not prompt any action by the ITUC. Rather, it was 
the IOE, contrary to Offe and Wiesenthal’s assumptions, which was seeking to disrupt the 
status quo.91 The CEACR had already been criticised by the employers’ group in the ILO 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (the CAS) on the basis that it was 
interpreting Conventions Nos 87 and 98, neither of which expressly mentioned the right to 
strike, and had in that way exceeded its constitutional powers.92 Such accusations became 
more heated as the response to EU case law by the CEACR was articulated. Notably, the 
employers’ group was led by Chris Syder, a representation of the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) from the UK, where the Viking case had first been heard and the BALPA case 
arose.  What followed was a rebellion led by the IOE culminating in a walkout by the 
employers’ group from the CAS, aimed at preventing consideration of supervisory findings 
made by the CEACR on the right to strike.93  
 
2. Other factors?   
 
The employers’ rebellion can also be attributed to other factors. One such factor may have 
been that the socialist threat of revolution was no longer likely or viable. While the IOE had 
advocated exercise of right to strike as a facet of freedom of association in communist 
regimes, such as Poland, IOE enthusiasm had waned at the end of the Cold War.94 From 1990 
onwards, the employers’ group had requested repeatedly that ‘dispute settlement’ be placed 
on the ILO International Labour Conference agenda, their hope seeming to be that the new 
balance of power would work in the employers’ favour so as to restrict access to industrial 
action. Aware of the potential for dilution of the right to strike, the workers’ group resisted 
that proposal.95 Arguably, this imbalance of bargaining power had been exacerbated by the 
 
91 See n.50 above. 
92 See, for example, Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 2009), ILC, 98th Session, 
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Questions and Practical Experience 144 Int. Lab Rev. 253 (2005). 




recent global financial crisis and the decline of trade union protections and access to the right 
to strike in times of austerity; Europe being no exception.96 
Recent ECHR jurisprudence may also have added fuel. At the time of the walkout, the 
employers’ group expressed concern that CEACR reports were being referred to in other 
supervisory proceedings, and arguably guiding State conduct.97 In other words, their 
findings ’were being viewed by the outside world as a form of soft law labour standards 
jurisprudence’.98 As Henner Gött has observed:  
The employers did not call the ECtHR by name. However, it can hardly be 
overlooked that the Court’s reversed stance on the right to strike was the proverbial 
elephant in the room, as it opened an avenue for workers to bring other contentious 
aspects of the right to strike before the ECtHR.99  
A further factor may have been the appointment of Guy Ryder to ILO Director-
General in May 2012. Although he did not take office until October 2012, the IOE may have 
wanted to be seen to resist the ILO becoming overly deferential to trade union interests. The 
recent unification of a divided movement under the ITUC, and under Ryder’s leadership, 
could certainly have seemed threatening. Moreover, if the IOE was competing with other 
business representatives for recognition on the international stage,100 this demonstration of its 
power may have been attractive. In this way, the employers’ action chimes with the fourth of 
Offe and Wiesenthal’s stages of political engagement, namely the withdrawal of ‘external 
guarantees’ prompted by employers when the surrounding circumstances look fortuitous.101 
By way of contrast, the ITUC, having in Offe and Wiesenthal’s terms conceded to the 
legitimacy of ILO political processes, would not take such retaliatory action in response. A 
walkout might be a political possibility for the employers’ group (despite its irony while 
protesting against a right to strike); but this was not an option for the workers’ group which 
was dependent on recognition of the legitimacy of ILO processes (and the external guarantees 
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it offered). The ITUC was however forced to face what Offe and Wiesenthal termed a fifth 
stage challenge to its previous commitment to political engagement.102  
Undaunted, the CEACR continued with its criticism of EU legal constraints on the 
right to strike, as manifested in BALPA.103 Similarly, in response to concerns raised 
concerning implementation of the Laval case in Sweden, the CEACR recalled ‘that imposing 
sanctions on unions for leading a legitimate strike is a grave violation of the principles of 
freedom of association’. An assessment of proportionality ‘bearing in mind a notion of 
freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services’ also did not comply with 
established ILO standards.104 Meanwhile, on the advice of the IOE as their secretariat, the 
employers’ group continued to block any approval of CEAR findings in the CAS, so that a 
‘special paragraph’, the ultimate sanction of the Conference for breach of labour standards 
could not be issued in respect of the right to strike.105  
The ITUC at this stage began to mobilize, launching a lengthy legal opinion of 122 
pages on The Right to Strike and the ILO, published on its website in March 2014, authored 
by the ITUC legal adviser, Jeffrey Vogt, joined by a number of academic scholars in support 
(myself included, alongside Ewing and Hendy).106 The ITUC expressed confidence that the 
CEACR position would be upheld were the matter placed before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion, since if the CEACR was not competent to interpret 
Comventions, the ICJ could do so under Article 31 of the ILO Constitution. The IOE in a 
thinner briefing (of 13 pages) posted on its website in October 2014, rejected the authority of 
the CEACR to interpret Convention No. 87 to include a right to strike,107 but also resisted 
 
102 Ibid., 109. 
103 ILO CEACR Report (2013), 196. 
104 Ibid., 176-180. 
105 Report of the CCAS, ILC Record of Proceedings (2013), Part I/13 and Part II. Discussed 
in Tonia Novitz, The Internationally Recognized Right to Strike: A Past, Present, and Future 
Basis upon Which to Evaluate Remedies for Unlawful Collective Action?, 30(3) International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 357, 375 (2014). 
106 Jeffrey Vogt et al, The Right to Strike and the ILO:  The Legal Foundations (April 29, 
2020), https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_final_brief_on_the_right_to_strike.pdf.  See 
text accompanying n.83 above. 









reference to the ICJ.108 Arguably, the confidence of the IOE of its relative power in this battle 
was indicated by this much briefer document and contradictory response. The stalemate 
situation at the ILO was then used by the IOE to seek to influence litigation on freedom of 
association and the right to strike in other regional and national fora.  
 
D. Using the ILO employers’ group walkout in other fora from 2013 – 2015 
 
Three key attempts were made by the IOE to use the employers’ group walkout to undermine 
the authority of previous CEACR jurisprudence on the right to strike. The first was made in a 
complaint relating to breach of Article 6 of the ESC before the European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR) in LO and TCO v Sweden.109 The second consisted of an intervention 
in the RMT case brought against the UK heard by the ECtHR.110 The last was in Canadian 
constitutional litigation culminating in the Saskatchewan judgment.111 In this way, the IOE 
sought cross-fertilisation of normative change between legal systems, seeking to unify them 
in a manner which reflected its rejection of CEACR jurisprudence. Yet, in no single instance 
was the IOE wholly successful. While Offe and Wiesenthal suggest that a union 
confederation might be particularly vulnerable at the point when external guarantees are 
withdrawn, such as the international recognition of the right to strike as a protected ILO 
standard, instead, the ETUC and ITUC were energised into presenting a strong litigious 
response. In so doing, these actors protected (and even arguably enhanced) the entitlement to 
take collective action in other regional and national systems.   
In the LO case, the Swedish trade unions successfully pursued their complaint with 
the assistance of the ETUC. The ECSR refused to view the right to strike as a mere exception 
to economic freedoms, concluding that it was unduly restricted by the Swedish legislation 
implementing the Laval decision.112 The IOE and BusinessEurope had offered 
‘Observations’, referring to the walkout by the ILO employers’ group, asking that ‘[g]iven 
the importance of this debate at international level’, the ECSR ‘take into account the current 
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discussion taking place among the ILO tripartite constituents’.113 The ETUC offered its own  
‘Observations’, pointing to CEACR criticism of the Laval legislation in 2013, making 
reference also to the BALPA case.114 It did not mention the ILO employers’ group walkout 
and neither ultimately did the ECSR. The ECSR decision made an implicit statement by 
simply ignoring that context, while offering an extensive review of relevant ILO standards, 
including mention of ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and CEACR findings.115  
The UK Government in the RMT v UK case sought to resist a claim that protection of 
freedom of association under Article 11 of the ECHR entailed protection of secondary action 
(which is prohibited under British legislation). While the UK accepted that ‘the right afforded 
under Article 11 to join a trade union normally implied the ability to strike’,116 it was argued 
that this could not be derived from ILO jurisprudence, as ‘the question of a right to strike was 
currently the cause of sharp controversy within the ILO, as part of which the status of the ILO 
Committee of Experts [the CEACR] had been called into question’.117 The IOE seemingly 
had no need to seek notice as a ‘third party’, since its views were represented by the UK 
Government. The ETUC did however intervene, alongside the British Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) which is an ITUC affiliate, arguing that ILO (and ESC) jurisprudence on the right to 
strike and condemnation of the UK was authoritative.118 The ECtHR’s majority opinion did 
make explicit reference to the dispute at the ILO, but ostensibly denied its relevance, saying 
that the disagreements had ‘originated with and were confined to the employer group’ while 
government representatives continued to endorse established ILO jurisprudence.119 
Nevertheless, that judgment found that ‘negative assessments made by the relevant 
monitoring bodies of the ILO and European Social Charter’ did not, in this instance, have 
sufficient ‘persuasive weight’ to find that the UK’s legal treatment of secondary action 
constituted a violation of Article 11.120 The ECtHR also declined ‘to determine whether the 
taking of industrial action should now be accorded the status of an essential element of the 
Article 11 guarantee’, even though it is regarded as a necessary aspect of freedom of 
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association and the right to organise in ILO supervisory findings.121  In his separate 
‘Concurring Opinion’, Judge Wojtyczek relied more directly on the actions of the employer 
group as a reason to resist application of ILO principles regarding a right to strike, reaching 
the same conclusion as the majority.122   
By 2013, the IOE was already seeking to intervene in Canadian proceedings, offering 
affidavit support of the contention that the right to strike was not enshrined in the ILO’s 
international labour standards,123 and in doing so was countered energetically by the ITUC.124 
The dispute at the ILO was again cited in submissions before the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Saskatchewan case. In response, a minority judgment delivered by Judges Rothstein and 
Wagner cited ‘trouble at the ILO’ as a reason to disregard CEACR and CFA jurisprudence.125 
Nevertheless, a majority of the Court in the compelling judgment delivered by Abella J found 
that a total strike ban on those unilaterally designated ‘essential service employees’ (without 
any alternative arbitration as contemplated in the ILO supervisory jurisprudence) violated the 
principle of freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.126 In so doing, Abella J’s judgment was more supportive of the right to strike than 
the ECtHR in RMT, confirming that: “The right to strike is not merely derivative of collective 
bargaining, it is an indispensable component of that right.”127  
The Saskatchewan judgment was delivered on 30 January 2015. On 18 February 
2015, the ITUC organized a ‘global day of action on the right to strike’ which led to 
widespread protests by affiliate unions around the world.128 This can be viewed as an attempt 
to demonstrate workers’ willingness to act, as Offe and Wiesenthal might have anticipated,129 
but the ITUC’s litigious mobilization may have had in fact more influence. In doing so, the 
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ITUC drew on extensive institutional and societal resources, its assets including the message 
of unity, expressed by engagement with affiliate unions and other allies like the ETUC.  
Ultimately, on 23 February 2015, a compromise agreement was reached in the form 
of a ‘Joint Statement of Workers’ and Employers’ Groups’ at the ILO.130 The Joint Statement 
recognised ‘the mandate of the CEACR’ as defined in the CEACR’s own report of 2015, 
while also acknowledging that:  ‘The right to take industrial action by workers and employers 
in support of their legitimate industrial interests is recognised by the constituents of the 
International Labour Organisation.’ However, while the ‘Government Group Statement’ 
expressly stated ‘that the right to strike is linked to freedom of association which is a 
fundamental principle and right at work of the ILO’ and that ‘the complex body of 
recommendations and observations developed in the past 65 years of application of 
Convention 87 by the various components of the ILO supervisory system constitutes a 
valuable resource’,131 those acknowledgements are missing from the Joint Statement and 
were never the subject of IOE commitments.  
 
E. The swing back (but not too far) 2016 – 2019 
 
There does seems to have been a swing back towards protection of protection of the right to 
strike as a facet of freedom of association and the right to organise, with the determined 
advocacy of both the ETUC and ITUC, but it has not gone too far. For example, in 2017 a 
European Pillar of Social Rights was adopted by the EU,132 which makes specific reference to 
collective bargaining and the right to take collective action in principle 8. However, the 
Commission Communication issued in January 2020 for ‘A Strong Social Europe for Just 
Transitions’133 mentioned only social dialogue and collective bargaining, not collective action 
or a right to strike.  
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Following the RMT judgment, ECtHR case law has been inconsistent. The judgment 
in Association of Academics v Iceland134 made no mention of ILO standards, but repeated the 
finding in RMT that a right to strike may be protected under Article 11 but is not an essential 
element of freedom of association.135 By way of contrast, the majority judgment136 in 
Ognevenko v Russia137 is notable for its assertion that the right to strike is ‘one of the most 
important means’ by which trade unions and their members could defend their interests under 
Article 11.138 That judgment referred extensively to both CEACR and CFA findings.139 
Notably, these were both public sector cases in which the IOE was not directly interested. 
At the ILO, despite opposition from the IOE, a new edition of CFA findings was 
issued as a ‘Compilation’ of Decisions in 2018. There was however a change in title from the 
past ‘Digest’ of Decisions, although the format remains largely the same.140 The IOE 
continue to insist that the right to strike has never been ‘regulated at the supranational or 
global level’, including by ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98.141 While the employers’ group 
constitute a minority in the ILC and ILO Governing Body, their adamant opposition on this 
issue has been curiously persuasive in extracting concessions. The ILO International Labour 
Conference in the 2019 Centenary Declaration142 and even the International Labour Office 
report on Sustainable Development Goal 8143 are notably silent on the subject of a right to 
strike. By way of comparison, the ITUC offers no countervailing threat and perhaps would 
not want to undermine the leadership of the current Director-General. This dynamic seems to 
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continue in the re-examination of ILO standards and supervisory mechanisms through the 
‘Standards Review Mechanism’.144 
Greater support for a right to strike has been forthcoming instead from the UN human 
rights system, due to the 2018 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly 
and Freedom of Association145 and the Joint Statement of the UN Human Rights Committee 
and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The latter says that the right to 
strike is ‘corollary to the effective exercise of the right to form and join trade unions’.146 The 
ITUC has won the argument in that sphere, even if tripartism makes a palpable victory less 




The tale told in this article might just seem like a clash of systems or another story of 
fragmentation. ILO norms have been put to use differently in different systems (the EU being 
separate from the Council of Europe). An autopoietic analysis would prompt us to identify 
the communicative processes by which cross-fertilisation or disruption has been achieved and 
perhaps suggest procedural solutions. This ‘neutral’ approach may however be deceptive.147 
It has been argued in this article that important roles are played in these settings by 
transnational representatives of employers and workers, especially the IOE and ITUC, and 
that the relative power of these agents may be significant.   
Some of the ways in which the IOE and ITUC have sought to exercise political 
influence are reminiscent of observations once offered by Offe and Wiesenthal regarding the 
dynamics of interactions between national employer and worker associations.148 Rejection by 
the IOE of established ILO norms and pursuit of litigation in a variety of other spheres citing 
that rejection, accords with predictions made by Offe and Wiesenthal that employers’ 
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associations, when they have the opportunity, are likely to disrupt the expectations of 
workers’ associations which have become overly dependent on external guarantees given by 
political institutions.149 Their model assumed that this challenge by employers would come 
from a place of strength, and that analysis accords with the increase in employer power at the 
end of the Cold War and in a time of austerity. Another reading, less consistent with their 
hypothesis is that the IOE was acting out a sense of vulnerability and a need to utilise its ILO 
influence to persuade business of its relevance and viability, perceiving itself in competition 
with other forms of business representation on the global scale and alarmed that the ILO 
might be vulnerable to increasing ITUC influence. Indeed, the IOE’s difficulties may be 
continuing, since the Confederation of British Industry, whose representative Chris Syder 
was the chief proponent of the 2012 employers’ group walkout, is no longer a member of the 
IOE.150  
Whether acting out of strength or vulnerability, the IOE placed the ITUC in a position 
where had to respond, namely in a fifth stage of crisis in political engagement that Offe and 
Wiesenthal had anticipated. The ITUC did, as they suggested it should, seek to demonstrate 
its members’ willingness to act through a rare global day of action in 2015. However, this 
was a one-off event and it seems to have been the ITUC’s ongoing response to the litigious 
claims of the IOE, by fully deploying its institutional and societal resources in alliances 
(unity) with the ETUC, GUFs and its national union members, that was its most effective 
form of collective mobilization. Moreover, it seems that the ITUC appreciates the need for 
external guarantees beyond the ILO, where they are forthcoming in other systems, such as the 
UN and Council of Europe human rights systems and even within the EU.  
Arguably, the challenge the IOE faces has also highlighted the need to strengthen its 
membership bases and alliances so as to be able to mobilise effectively. A restrictive 
approach to freedom of association only for narrowly defined workers,151 would limit the 
ITUC’s ability to act and thereby exercise future influence. In this respect, the ITUC 
campaign for an extended ‘Universal Labour Guarantee’ as a facet of decent work and 
 
149 See Offe and Wiesenthal, n.16 above, 108. 
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Human Rights-Based Approach, 46(2) Industrial Law Journal 185 (2017). Reflected in a 
wider community-based lobby, for example see ‘Clean Slate for Worker Power: Building a 




sustainable development is likely to be important for its strategic aims.152 The ITUC may also 
need to assert its interests in a wider range of issues which also overlap with that of other UN 
agencies, such as the World Health Organization, in the context of the impact of the 
coronavirus crisis on worker health.153 In these ways, an awakening to the potential 
limitations of ILO processes may not lead to the fragility anticipated by Offe and Wiesenthal, 
even if the ITUC cannot readily demonstrate the willingness to act of the workers who are the 
members of its affiliates. Rather, in contemporary global politics, the ITUC may yet utilise 
other resources to greater effect.  
 
152 ITUC, ‘ITUC takes demand for a New Social Contract to the UN General Assembly’ 
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